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FIRREA AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE EXTENT TO
WHICH THEY PREEMPT STATE LAW REGARDING




Over the past few years, the press has focused much of its attention
on the collapse of the federal savings and loan industry and the resulting
impact on the nation's economy.' More recently, the press has turned
some of that attention to the federal banking industry2 in which the
highest rate of bank failures since the Great Depression 3 has raised the
specter that the federal funds insuring deposits are at serious risk of
drying up.4 The two federal regulatory agencies that overlook the sav-
ings and loan and banking industries, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have be-
come more aggressive in their efforts to recoup lost funds. Congress
has joined these efforts by passing the Financial Institution Reform, Re-
1. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Responsibility & Regulation: The Savings &
Loan Industry, in VITAL SPEECHES Or THE DAY 718 (1989) ("[Tlhis is a very, very
sick industry, and many S&Ls cannot and should not be saved."); The $1 Billion-
a-Day Cleanup: Costs of the S&L Debacle Create Woes for the President, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 21, 1990, at 31 (discussing political impact of savings and loan
failures); David Zigas, Taxpayers Shouldn't Foot the Bill for S&L Bondholders, Bus.
WK., Apr. 23, 1990, at 111 (discussing alternatives to tax revenues as means of
salavaging lost funds).
The collapse of the savings and loan industry is largely to blame for an ex-
ected all-time record deficit in fiscal 1992 of $348.3 billion; the 1991 deficit of
268.7 billion was itself a record. See U.S. Deficit for '91 Was Worst Ever, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Oct. 30, 1991, at Al (discussing impact of savings and loan cleanup
on federal budget deficit).
2. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, The Bank Crisis and the S&L Fiasco: Two Sides of a
Bad Coin, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 1991, at 16 (noting that Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is badly underfunded). Blinder, a Princeton University eco-
nomics professor, believes that while savings and loans owe their demise to the
failure of risky but high-yielding investments, banks are losing money due to bad
business judgment. Id. In particular, developing countries, corporate raiders
and defenders, and real estate developers have proven to be bad credit risks for
the banks. Id.
3. Brett D. Fromson, Will the FDIC Run Out of Money?, FORTUNE, Oct. 8,
1990, at 119 (noting that banks have been failing at highest rate since Great
Depression and that 354 banks reported consecutive annual losses from 1986 to
1990).
4. See id. at 120 (indicating that FDIC's insurance fund shrunk by $5.1 bil-
lion in 1988 and 1989);John Greenwald, Requiem fora Heavyweight, TIME,Jan. 21,
1991, at 54-55 ("[I]t is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that taxpayer
money will be needed to finance bank bailouts if conditions deteriorate." (quot-
ing FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman)).
(1461)
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covery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 5 Among other goals, 6
FIRREA targets depository institution 7 directors, imposing liability for
breach of their corporate duties.8
While Congress broadens the potential liability of financial institu-
tion directors, state legislatures are curbing corporate director liability. 9
Several states, including Pennsylvania,' 0 recently enacted legislation
5. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The passage of FIRREA was in part a direct result
of the perceived degree of fraud and insider abuse in the savings and loan indus-
try. See Raymond S. Sczudlo & David S. Dederick, Directors' and Officers' Liability
Considerations After the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 115, 117 (Commercial
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 535, 1990).
6. In at least three ways, FIRREA expands the ability of federal regulators
to affect the operation of financial institutions. First, the statute expands the
scope of parties subject to the regulators' enforcement authority. The enforce-
ment authority not only reaches a bank, savings and loan, or their directors and
officers, but also now reaches consultants and independent contractors such as
attorneys and accountants. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990) (defining
"institution-affiliated party"). Second, FIRREA increases the personal liability
of parties who are subject to the statute's enforcement authority. See id.
§ 1818(i)-(j). Third, FIRREA grants new enforcement mechanisms to regula-
tors, including cease and desist orders, removal orders and the authority to take
action against a party who has left the financial institution. See id. See generally
Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 123-28 (discussing impact of FIRREA
changes).
7. The term "depository institution" is one of the terms of art used in FIR-
REA. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). This term is used
instead of the term "bank" to make it clear that the statute addresses savings
associations and banks alike. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. 11 1990); Sczudlo & Dede-
rick, supra note 5, at 124.
Another FIRREA term of art is "institution-affiliated party," which replaces
terms such as "director," "officer," "employee," "agent" and "other person
participating in the affairs of an institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1818; Sczudlo & Dede-
rick, supra note 5, at 123.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. I 1990). Under § 1821(k), depository insti-
tution directors and officers are personally liable for breaching their "duty of
care." Id. For the text of § 1821(k), see infra note 24. For a discussion of
§ 1821 (k), see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
9. Several states have amended corporate statutes to afford greater protec-
tion to directors who are considering takeover bids. Many of these new statutes
owe their origins to a landmark Delaware case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding that
when sale of corporate control becomes inevitable, responsibility of directors
shifts from defending the corporate bastion to attaining highest value for share-
holders). See generally Robert C. Lewis, Obligations and Responsibilities of Directors of
Public Companies in a Takeover Context, in AcQuISITIONS AND MERGERS IN A CHANG-
ING ENVIRONMENT, 765, 808-40 (Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No.
700, 1990) (reviewing Revlon and post-Revlon cases involving directors' duties in
overseeing sale of company).
10. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1793 (Supp. 1992). For a further
discussion on how the Pennsylvania corporate law seeks to shield directors from
personal liability, see infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
1462
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narrowly defining the scope of a corporate director's duties, I I the stan-
dard of liability imposed upon a director 12 and the parties who have
standing to bring an action against a director.' 3 Certain aspects of these
laws conflict with FIRREA and the rules of decision found in the accu-
mulated federal cases involving actions brought against savings and loan
and bank directors.' 4 Accordingly, the goal of this Comment is to deter-
mine the extent to which FIRREA and "federal common law" preempt
state law regarding the duties and standard of liability imposed upon
bank and savings and loan directors.
II. FIRREA
A. History of FIRREA
Prior to the passage of FIRREA in 1989, two primary sources of
legislation granted federal regulators enforcement power over financial
institutions. The first source of legislation was the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA). 15 FISA gave federal banking agencies
the authority to issue cease and desist orders, to suspend and remove
directors and to issue prohibition orders. 16 The second source of legis-
lation was the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Con-
trol Act of 1978 (FIRA). 17 FIRA enhanced federal regulators' power
11. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (duty of director runs "solely to the
business corporation"). Pennsylvania law provides that a director "shall per-
form his duties ... in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation." Id. § 1712(a). In considering what is in the "best interests
of the corporation," the director may, but is not required to, consider what effect
his action will have "upon any or all groups affected by such action, including
shareholders." Id. § 1715(a)(1). Similarly, a Pennsylvania director is free to
consider both the long-term and short-term impact of his action "and the possi-
bility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation." § 1715(a)(2).
12. Id. § 1713 (shareholders may adopt by-laws providing that director is
not personally liable for any action taken, unless director breached duty under
subchapter, and breach constitutes self-dealing, willful misconduct or
recklessness).
13. Id. § 1717 (duty of director may be enforced directly by corporation or
may be enforced by shareholder in derivative suit but may not be enforced di-
rectly by a shareholder individually or by another person or group).
14. See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir. 1980)
("[I]t is well settled that the fiduciary duty of a bank officer or director is owed to
the depositors and shareholders of the bank." (emphasis added)); see also FDIC v.
Mason, 115 F.2d 548, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1940) (holding that "bank directors have a
duty at common law to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of
the affairs of their bank" (emphasis added) (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132 (1891)); Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1940) (noting
that law holds bank president "to standards of probity and fidelity more lofty
than those of 'the market place' "), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 (1940).
15. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
16. See id.
17. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
3
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already granted under FISA.18 Other statutes complemented FIRA and
FISA with additional enforcement powers. 19
FIRREA was designed in part to consolidate FIRA, FISA and other
scattered regulatory statutes into a single enforcement scheme. 20 FIR-
REA was also designed to clarify ambiguities in the agencies' enforce-
ment authority.2 1 Most importantly, FIRREA was designed to expand
"the ability of regulators to impose personal liability on directors, of-
ficers and others affiliated with financial institutions."'2 2
B. The Extent to Which FIRREA Preempts State Law
FIRREA expands the ability of regulators to impose personal liabil-
ity on financial institution directors by codifying the standard of liabil-
ity. 2 3 Section 1821(k) of FIRREA provides that depository institution
directors and officers face civil monetary damages if they are grossly
negligent in the discharge of a "duty of care."' 24 A director also faces
of 12 U.S.C.); see Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 119-22 (discussing pre-
FIRREA financial institution enforcement schemes). Like FIRREA, the FISA
and FIRA statutes were passed in response to perceived deficiencies in the ex-
isting enforcement authority of the federal agencies. Id. at 120.
18. See Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 120-21. Prior to the passage of
FISA in 1966, regulators relied on largely ineffective informal sanctions against
financial institutions. Id. at 120. Under FISA, directors and officers of financial
institutions could be suspended or removed for, "among other things, violation
of law or breach of fiduciary duties." Id. at 120-21 (citing 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(d)(4), 17 3 0(g), 17 8 6 (g), 1818(e) (1982)).
19. Id. at 121. In addition to FIRA and FISA, other statutes allowed federal
banking agencies to conduct examinations, enter into written agreements with
financial institututions, levy civil monetary penalties against the institution and
its directors, terminate deposit insurance and revoke federal charters. Id.
20. Id. The statutes included the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA), 12
U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) (governing federally chartered thrifts, federally insured
thrifts and savings and loan holding companies); the National Housing Act
(NHA), 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982) (governing same institutions as HOLA); the
Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (1982) (governing federally
insured credit unions); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-1833e (1982) (governing federally insured banks and bank holding
companies). Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 121 n. 15.
21. Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 121. Sczudlo and Dederick provide
an example of the ambiguities thought to exist in previous enforcement author-
ity. Prior to FIRREA, the law was unclear as to whether federal agencies could
force directors, officers and other financial institution directors to make restitu-
tion for losses to institutions stemming from the breach of cease and desist or-
ders. Id. at 121-22 (citing Larimore v. Comptroller of Currency, 789 F.2d 1244,
1256 (7th Cir. 1986)). FIRREA expressly provides that the FDIC possesses such
authority. Id. at 122 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
22. Id. at 117. Sczudlo and Dederick remark that according to the Chair-
man of the Resolution Trust Corporation, L. William Seidman, fraud and insider
abuse within the savings and loan industry may explain sixty percent of all recent
savings and loan failures. Id. at 117 n.2 (citing More Than Half of Failed S&Ls Were
Fraud Victims, Seidman Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 375 (1990)).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990).
24. Id. Section 1821(k), which addresses the personal liability of financial
4
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liability for "conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard for a duty of
care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as
such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law."' 25
FIRREA contemplates the imposition of liability in cases where the
FDIC is acting in its role as a conservator or receiver of a failed deposi-
tory institution. 26 The civil monetary damages can be very steep. The
maximum penalties begin at five thousand dollars per day and can reach
as high as one million dollars per day for as long as a FIRREA violation
continues, depending upon the type of violation.
2 7
In defining the standard of liability imposed upon financial institu-
tion directors and officers, FIRREA does not expressly preempt state
law. A review of the statute's legislative history, however, erases any
doubt as to Congress' intention in this matter. A House Conference
report on the statute reads: "[Section 1821(k)] preempts state law with
respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity against officers or
institution directors and officers, is a cornerstone provision of FIRREA. It
states:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf
of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation ... for gross negli-
gence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including
intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined
under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or
affect any right of the [FDIC] under other applicable law.
Id. (emphasis added)..
25. Id.
26. Id. After a bank has been declared insolvent, the FDIC takes over as the
receiver. Id. § 1821(c). The FDIC as receiver has two choices: 1) liquidate the
assets of the bank and pay off the depositors; or 2) sell certain assets and liabili-
ties of the failed bank to another bank and purchase any leftover assets in its own
corporate capacity. See FDIC v. Butcher, 660 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (E.D. Tenn.
1987).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (Supp. I 1990). The types of penalties and their
corresponding monetary damages are divided into three tiers. The first tier ap-
plies to individuals or institutions who violate a law, regulation, final or tempo-
rary agency order, written condition imposed by a regulator or agreement
between the institution and the regulator. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(A). The maximum
civil penalty under the first tier is not more than $5,000 per day for each day
during which such violation continues. Id. Second tier violations require a
showing that a party has: 1) engaged in an unsafe and unsound practice,
breached a fiduciary duty to the institution or committed a Tier 1 violation, and
2) that the violation, practice or breach of duty is a pattern of misconduct, that
the instution will suffer more than a minimal loss as a result or that the conduct
resulted in a pecuniary gain to the party. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(B). Under the second
tier, the maximum penalty is $25,000 per day for each day of violation. Id. A
third tier violation involves knowing violations of FIRREA and either knowingly
or recklessly causing a "substantial loss" to the institution or receiving a "sub-
stantial pecuniary gain or other benefit." Id. § 1818(i)(2)(C). The maximum
penalty under the third tier is $1,000,000 per day for each day of the violation.
Id. § 1818(i)(2)(C)-(D). See Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 131-33 (discuss-
ing three tiers of penalties and conduct necessary to qualify for each tier).
5
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directors of an insured depository institution. ' 28 Thus, the inference is
strong that, with regard to the standard of liability for breach of a "duty of
care," FIRREA preempts state law.
The proper definition and scope of the "duty of care" remain un-
clear under § 1821(k). This provision refers to state law as a source for
defining certain terms, such as "intentional tortious conduct."' 29 Some
commentators have postulated that because the statute depends upon
state law to supply definitions for terms, the law of the forum state also
may define "gross negligence" itself.3 0 The question remains whether
state law also may define the "duty of care" expected of depository insti-
tution directors within the meaning of FIRREA, or whether FIRREA in-
corporates a body of federal common law defining the duties of financial
institution directors and officers.
Whether there is a body of federal common law is of great impor-
tance to financial institution directors because state common law differs
from federal common law in this area. Pennsylvania corporate law, for
instance, affords much greater protection to financial institution direc-
tors than the law developed by the federal cases. One difference be-
tween Pennsylvania law and federal law is in the scope of the duty of
financial institution directors. In Pennsylvania, a director's duties run
"solely to the business corporation." 3' Conversely, under federal com-
mon law, a bank director owes fiduciary duties to the depositors.3 2 An-
other difference between Pennsylvania law and federal common law is
standing. Pennsylvania law bars suits against directors by anyone other
than shareholders or the corporation; even then, shareholders may only
bring claims derivatively and not individually.33 By contrast, when a
28. H.R. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 398 (1989), reprinted in
Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 126 n.27. The report adds that "[t]he pre-
emption allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross negligence or any conduct
that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care, including intentional
tortious conduct." Id.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990).
30. Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 127. The commentators noted:
"The reference to 'applicable state law,' however, indicates that 'gross negli-
gence' may be defined under the laws of the state in which the case arises." Id.
This interpretation is plausible because FIRREA made no attempt to define
gross negligence." See 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (Supp. 11 1990).
31. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (Supp. 1992) (duty of director "solely
to business corporation").
32. See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir. 1980)
(noting that fiduciary duty of bank officer or director is owed to depositors and
shareholders of bank); First Nat'l Bank of La Marque v. Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824,
830-31 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (observing that director's fiduciary duty to make certain
that economic rewards accruing from corporate opportunity inure to owners of
enterprise even stronger in case of bank because of duty to depositors), aff'd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980); City Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 656 (E.D. Wisc. 1975) (recognizing
that federal savings and loan association has fiduciary duties to borrowers).
33. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (duty of director may be enforced di-
1466 [Vol. 37: p. 1461
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bank is in receivership, the federal cases hold that an individual deposi-
tor may bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duties against savings and
loan directors.3 4 To succeed, the depositor must prove he or she suf-
fered an injury uncommon to other depositors.35 Given these types of
differences, it becomes necessary to determine whether a financial insti-
tution director should be held accountable under the broader expecta-
tions imposed by the federal cases, or whether the director can instead
rely on the greater protection provided by state law. The answer to this
question depends on whether federal common law in this area really
exists today.
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN SAVINGS AND LOAN DISPUTES
A. Briggs v. Spaulding
A discussion of bank director duties under the federal common law
appropriately begins with the centenarian Supreme Court case of Briggs
v. Spaulding.3 6 In Briggs, a bank receiver brought a suit in equity against
five directors of the bank for "neglect of duty and wrongful conduct."
'37
The case arose after the bank's board of directors changed hands in Jan-
uary 1882.38 In October of the previous year, the bank was solvent and
prosperous, but by April 1882-only a few months after the new direc-
tors took office-the bank was insolvent. 39 The complaint alleged that
the directors committed misconduct, failed "to perform faithfully and
rectly by corporation or may be enforced by shareholder in derivative suit but
may not be enforced directly by a shareholder individually or by another person
or group).
34. In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 880 (3d Cir. 1990); Brandenberg
v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1191 (4th Cir. 1988). Generally, once a financial insti-
tution goes into receivership, all claims belong to the receiver as assets of the
institution. See Brandenberg, 859 F.2d at 1191 (damages recoverable in deposi-
tors' RICO action against officers of failed savings and loan belong to state re-
ceiver as asset to institution). An exception is carved out for depositors who
suffer an injury uncommon to other depositors. See In re Sunrise, 916 F.2d at 880
(holding that depositors permitted to maintain nonderivative action against of-
ficers and directors of savings and loan association only if their injuries are sepa-
rate and distinct from injuries sustained by institution and other depositors).
35. In re Sunrise, 916 F.2d at 880; Brandenberg, 859 F.2d at 1191.
36. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
37. Id. at 134. The named plaintiff was the receiver of the bank, who suc-
ceeded two earlier receivers. Id. Before the case came before the Supreme
Court, it was heard and dismissed by the United States Circuit Court for the
Northern District of New York (now represented by the Second Circuit). Id. at
144.
38. Id. at 135. The new directors were Reuben Porter Lee, Francis E. Coit,
Eldredge E. Spaulding, William H. Johnson and John H. Vought. Id. The
named officers were Lee as president, Coit as vice president, a man named Mc-
Knight as cashier and another man named Bogert as assistant cashier. Id.
39. Id. at 135-36. Up until the time of the election of the new directors, the
bank had $100,000 in paid-up capital stock, had paid declared dividends
"amounting in the aggregate of 285 per cent" of the par value and had a surplus
fund of over $74,000. Id. By April 14, 1882, the surplus no longer existed, the
1992] COMMENT 1467
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diligently the duties of their office" 4 0 and were grossly negligent in
trusting the entire management to a president "of inconsiderable finan-
cial responsibility and of insufficient age and experience to qualify him
for that position."'4 1 The thrust of the allegations was that the board
had deferred all business of the bank to a president who squandered the
bank's money and who made irresponsible and undersecured loans.
42
The plaintiff sought recovery for the bank, its stockholders and its
creditors.
43
The plaintiff's complaint in Briggs was "framed upon a theory of a
breach by the defendants as directors 'of their common-law duties as trust-
ees of a financial corporation and breaches of special restrictions and
obligations of the National Banking Act.' ",44 The relevant section
under the National Banking Act (Act) provided that "[e]ach director,
when appointed or elected, shall take an oath that he will, so far as the
duty devolves on him, diligently and honestly administer the affairs of
such association, and will not knowingly violate, or willingly permit to be
violated, any of the provisions of this title."'4 5 If a director knowingly
violated a provision of the Act or knowingly permitted a violation of the
Act by officers, agents or servants of the bank, then the bank could be
dissolved. 46 The directors also could be held personally and individu-
ally liable for any resulting losses.
47
While the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants knowingly
committed any violations of the Act,48 he did allege that the directors
bank's liabilities totaled over a million dollars and many of the bank's assets
were worthless. Id. at 136.
40. Id. at 136. The "greater part" of the bank's losses were alleged to have
occurred from the period of October 3, 1881 to April 14, 1882, when the de-
fendants were in control of the bank. Id.
41. Id. at 139. Lee, the appointed president, was formerly the bank's cash-
ier and had served as a director for five years. Id. at 134-35. The opinion does
not indicate how old Lee was when he was elected president.
42. See id. at 145-46. Entrusting the affairs of the bank to the president was
not new to the bank; the bank had been doing so for at least fourteen years. Id.
at 145. A long list of charges were made against the president, including lend-
ing large sums of money to himself, family members, friends and "to other per-
sons with whom [he] was engaged in speculations." Id. at 139.
43. Id. at 140. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were charged as
jointly and severally liable for the bank's losses after the capital became impaired
or after the bank became insolvent Id. at 142-43.
44. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). The complaint had been brought in eq-
uity, suggesting that the receiver himself was unsure of whether there was a via-
ble remedy at law. See id. at 134.
45. Id. at 144 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5147 (1925)). Bank officials must take
the same oath today. See 12 U.S.C. § 73 (1988). Other sections of the Act delin-
eated the organizational and managerial structure of banks. See Briggs, 141 U.S.
at 143-44.
46. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 144 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5239).
47. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5239).
48. Id. at 145. The plaintiff also did not allege that the directors were guilty
of any dishonesty in administering the affairs of the bank. Id. The Court did
1468 [Vol. 37: p. 1461
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failed to diligently perform duties imposed upon them by the Act.49
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument.5 0 In a five-to-four decision
authored by ChiefJustice Fuller, the majority held that "directors must
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the affairs
of the bank, and that this includes something more than officiating as
figure-heads."'' S The directors had a "duty of reasonable supervision"
over the bank's officers. 52 The majority concluded that under the facts,
the five directors had satisfied their duty.5 3 In a dissent authored by
Justice Harlan, the minority agreed with the standard but disagreed as to
its application to three of the directors.
5 4
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument involving the directors'
obligations under the National Banking Act because the act did not spe-
cifically impose any duty upon the directors as individuals.5 5 The Court
found, however, that the charge of neglect of duty on the part of the
board was "another question" apart from the provisions of the National
Banking Act.56 The resolution of the case therefore did not turn on the
note that the bank had not followed its own by-laws, which, among other re-
quirements, called for monthly meetings of the board of directors. Id.
49. Id. at 145-46. If any board director had participated in or assented to a
violation of the law, he could be held individually liable. Id. at 146.
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id. at 165.
52. Id. The Court added that bank directors should not be shielded from
liability because they are ignorant of their misconduct "if that ignorance is the
result of gross inattention." Id. at 166. The Court's remark about "gross inat-
tention" is at odds with its standard of "reasonable care and prudence." The
opinion can therefore be criticized for announcing one standard but applying
another.
The Court's definition of "gross inattention" is akin to FIRREA's standard
of gross negligence. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (Supp. II 1990). For the text of
section 1821(k), see supra note 24.
53. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 166. The Court examined in great detail the alleged
liability of each defendant and the relevant facts entered into evidence. See id. at
152-66. The dispositive factor, according to the Court, was the limited period of
time between the defendant directors' election and the bank's fall into liquida-
tion. Id. at 166. The Court did not consider "the[] defendants fairly liable for
not preventing loss by putting the bank into liquidation within ninety days after
they became directors." Id.
54. Id. at 166-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent's standard of liability
rested on "such diligence and supervision as the situation and the nature of the
business require[d]." Id. at 170 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Under the evidence
before them, the dissent believed that Spaulding, Coit and Johnson should have
been liable for the bank's losses. Id. at 166 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 146. Under the National Banking Act, the business and affairs of
the bank could be carried out by its officers. Id. at 144-45. This did not mean to
the Court that officers had unfettered, unsupervised control over the bank's
business. Id. at 146. Nevertheless, the Court believed that the language of the
Act permitted the directors to claim they were "guilty of no violation of a duty
directly devolved upon them." Id.
56. Id. at 146. The majority asserted that "although special provisions of
the statute are quoted and relied upon, these do not create the cause of action,
but merely furnish the standard of duty and the evidence of wrongdoing." Id.
9
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provisions of the National Banking Act. Instead, as the Court stated,
"[tihe liability of directors to the corporation for damages caused by
unauthorized acts rests upon the common-law rule which renders every
agent liable who violates his authority to the damage of his principal."
'5 7
Under this theory, directors are not liable "for losses resulting from the
wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents, unless the loss is
a consequence of their own neglect of duty, either for failure to super-
vise the business with attention or in neglecting to use proper care in the
appointment of agents."
'58
The holding in Briggs soon became the cornerstone upon which a
tower of "common law" banking director duties was built. After Briggs,
federal courts applied the standard of "ordinary care and prudence in
the administration and affairs of the bank" to a myriad of circumstances,
including: the duty of bank directors to commission an independent au-
dit of the bank's affairs; 59 the duty to forbid the approval of loans in
excess of federal statutes;60 the duty to monitor the financial condition
of the bank;6 1 and the duty to approve and institute loan policies and
(quoting VICTOR MORAWETZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 556 (1882)).
57. Id. (emphasis added). It was believed by the Court that there could be
no bright line rule governing the degree of care and the prudence to be exer-
cised by the director. See id. at 147. The Court stated: "The degree of care
required depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case has
to be determined in view of all the circumstances." Id.
58. Id. at 147.
59. FDIC v. Mason, 115 F.2d 548, 551 (3d Cir. 1940) (citing Briggs standard
of care and indicating that directors have duty at common law to periodically
examine affairs of bank). Mason was an action brought by the FDIC as a receiver
of a failed commercial bank. Id. at 548. The FDIC alleged, inter aba, that former
directors of the bank failed to take an accounting of money lost by the bank as a
result of the directors' negligence. Id. at 549. The trial court dismissed the ac-
tion after the FDIC presented its case. Id. at 548. The Third Circuit, however,
overruled the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
552.
60. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938) (depositors
have right to expect that directors will retain and maintain reasonable supervi-
sion over affairs of bank).
61. Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1986). The facts of Hoye
are hauntingly familiar to Briggs v. Spaulding. For the facts of Briggs, see supra
notes 36-49 and accompanying text. In Hoye, a trustee in bankruptcy brought an
action against a trust company's board of directors for breaches of their duties of
care under Oklahoma law. Hoye, 795 F.2d. at 894. The cause of action centered
around a highly leveraged investment the company made in certain mortgage
certificates. Id. During a two-year period, the company continued the invest-
ment while losses resulting from the certificates exceeded the company's assets.
Id. The district court held that one of the directors, Maxwell Meek, breached his
duty of care by failing "to monitor the investment decisions and results, and the
excessive authority which [he] delegated to his son." Id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding of lia-
bility. Id. at 897. The Oklahoma corporate law implicated in the case was appar-
ently inspired by Briggs and held boards of directors to a standard of care "which
10
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procedures. 6 2 The duties included are extensive. 63 In sum, the Briggs
decision served as a genesis for litigation over what conduct constituted
a breach of "ordinary care and prudence."
While the Briggs decision established a standard of care for bank
directors based on a common-law rule, it failed to label the "common
law" as either state common law or federal common law.6 4 At the time
of Briggs, however, it simply did not matter whether the distinction was
made, since federal courts freely recognized the existence of federal
common law.6 5 Briggs was decided long before the landmark case of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 66 in which the Supreme Court first expressed
serious hostility toward the recognition of "federal common law."'67
B. The Standard for Granting Federal Courts Authority to Fashion a Body of
Federal Common Law
Since Erie, the Supreme Court has expressed great reluctance in
recognizing federal common law rights. 68 However, every rule has its
exception. As the Supreme Court noted in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc. ,69 federal courts can recognize a federal common law right
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-
tion." Id. at 895 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34(b) (West 1986)).
62. Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 81 (1919) (finding direc-
tor who authorized loan in excess of lending limit liable for damages).
63. Seegenerally DENNIS BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE-FIDU-
CIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 30-48 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (dis-
cussing standard of care and standard of culpability for imposing personal
liability on corporate directors). These commentators note that Briggs v. Spauld-
ing is "the most frequently cited of early American decisions involving corporate
fiduciary obligations." Id. at 1. While courts and legislatures articulate in vary-
ing language the standard of care expected of corporate directors, "most agree
upon a 'traditional standard' dating back to the nineteenth century" decision
found in Briggs. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted) (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132, 152 (1891)).
64. The distinction between state and federal common law is important be-
cause a state statute defining a corporate director's duties would supercede that
state's common law definitions. But a state statute would not supercede a fed-
eral common law standard.
65. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (federal courts exercising
diversity of citizeship free to exercise independent judgment as to what common
law of state is or should be), overruled sub silentio by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
66. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67. Id. at 78 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State whether they be local in nature or 'general,' be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.").
68. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) ("The in-
stances where we have created federal common law are few and restricted.").
69. 451 U.S. 630 (1981). Texas Industries involved an antitrust action
brought by a cement purchaser against a ready-mix concrete manufacturer. Id.
at 632. The suit alleged that Texas Industries and other unnamed firms con-
spired to raise concrete prices unlawfully. Id. Following discovery, Texas Indus-
tries sought to bring a third-party complaint against Radcliff materials, seeking
19921 1471
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in two circumstances: 1) when it is "necessary to protect uniquely fed-
eral interests" 70 or 2) when Congress has specifically given federal
courts the power to fashion substantive law. 7 1
The first factor outlined in Texas Industries is not without qualifica-
tion. Implicating uniquely federal interests by itself is not sufficient to
displace a field of state law.7 2 The Court has stated that state law may
be displaced only where either a "significant conflict" exists between
federal policy or interests and the operation of state law, or where spe-
cific objectives of federal legislation would be frustrated were state law
to be applied.
73
Some lower federal courts have carved out an exception to the Texas
Industries factors to fashion a body of federal common law. This excep-
tion is based on a Supreme Court pronouncement made in United States
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. 74 that the rule of Erie does not apply to
issues "arising from or having a bearing on" a federal regulatory pro-
gram. 7 5 In such an event, federal courts are free to choose between
applying existing state law or creating an applicable body of federal
law.
7 6
contribution should Texas Industries be found liable. Id. at 633. Radcliff filed a
motion to dismiss the claim, arguing that federal law does not allow an antitrust
defendant to recover in contribution against alleged co-conspirators. Id. The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that contribution did not implicate "uniquely
federal interests" of the kind obliging courts to create federal common law. Id.
at 646-47.
70. Id. at 640 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398,
426 (1964)).
71. Id. (citing Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652).
72. Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 937 (3d Cir.) (cit-
ing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717
(1985)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). For a more detailed discussion of Ford
Motor, see infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
73. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (quoting
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). The Boyle Court
stated that when Congress legislates in an area traditionally occupied by the
states, the federal policy urging preemption must be more "sharp" than that
which must exist for "ordinary preemption." Id. The Court elaborated: "[T]he
fact that the area is one of uniquely federal concerns changes what would other-
wise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can." Id. at
507-08.
74. 412 U.S. 580 (1973). For a more detailed discussion of the facts and
issue in Little Lake, see infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
75. Little Lake, 412 U.S. at 592-93 ("[Tjhe inevitable incompleteness
presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts.")
76. Id. at 593. The Court stated that federal legislative silence must signify
the "recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing law in
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C. The Savings and Loan Industry as a Model
None of the reported cases address whether a body of federal com-
mon law has emerged from disputes involving federally chartered or
state-chartered banks. There are a number of cases in the savings and
loan context, however, which serve as an appropriate model. A review
of the recent cases reveals a trend toward rejecting federal common law
in this area, although earlier cases recognized a federal body of law.
Some courts have sidestepped the Texas Industries factors altogether
in fashioning a body of federal common law for savings and loan cases.
Noting the pervasiveness of regulations in the federal savings and loan
industry, at least one circuit court has cited Little Lake to support a hold-
ing that federal regulations preempt state law from applying to the en-
tire savings and loan industry. 7 7 In embracing this view, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in City Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Crowley 78 reasoned that because a savings and loan
director's duties arise from or have a bearing on the regulatory scheme,
it is free to create federal law. 79 The Crowley court recognized a federal
common law governing the internal affairs of federal savings and loan
associations; this federal common law "includes the usual common law
fiduciary duties." 80 Thus, the court deemed the corporation's claims of
wasting corporate assets, appropriation of business opportunities, fraud,
unjust enrichment and breach of contract to have arisen under the fed-
eral common law.8 1 In concert with the Crowley reasoning, at least one
circuit court has concluded that when state courts "deal with the internal
affairs of federal savings [and] loan associations .... they are nonethe-
less applying federal law."
'8 2
77. See Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145,
1146-47 (9th Cir. 1974) (indicating that exclusion of state action may be implied
from nature of congressional legislation and subject matter although express
declaration of preemption is absent).
78. 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
79. Id. at 646, 656 (holding that savings and loan association suit against
former directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty, wasting of assets,
fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment and breach of contract actionable under
federal common law); see also Rettig v. Arlington Heights Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405
F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (applying federal common law).
80. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. at 656. The Crowley court relied heavily on the
text of the Home Owners Loan Act, which provided that a director could be
removed from the board for a breach of fiduciary duty if the breach involved
activity for personal profit. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(4) (1988)).
81. Id. at 657.
82. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir.
1967). Murphy involved a battle between a federal savings and loan's board of
directors and its management. Id. at 610-11. In anticipation of an upcoming
board election, the existing board sought to obtain a list of shareholders who
would vote in the election. Id. The list was in the hands of management, which
remained recalcitrant in handing it over to the board. Id. Not surprisingly, the
directors proposed by management were elected and certified. Id. The ousted
directors then brought suit in federal court challenging management's actions.
1992] COMMENT 1473
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Other courts have stated that recognizing federal common law
rights is necessary under Texas Industries to protect the uniquely federal
interests implicated in the internal administration of federal savings and
loan associations. 8 3 To support this conclusion, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California referred to the "com-
prehensive legislative construction" and "overwhelming preponderance
of federal interests" involved in the operation of federal savings and
loan associations.8 4 In First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander,85 the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii held that because the sav-
ings and loan association in question was federally insured and subject
to many of the same laws governing federal institutions, a federal com-
mon law suit could be maintained in federal court even though the sav-
ings and loan was state-chartered. 8 6 In First Hawaiian, a ninety percent
stockholder of a savings and loan brought an action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty and negligence against former officers and directors of the de-
funct savings and loan.8 7 The complaint alleged "federal common law
negligence" and "federal common law breach of fiduciary duties."
88
The court held that the second claim could be maintained in the federal
court, but not the first.8 9
Id. Management in turn challenged the federal court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. d.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that fed-
eral law authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) "to provide
for the organization and operation of federal savings and loan associations
'under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.' " Id. at 611 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1464(a)). The question of whether the board should have access to
voter lists required a "fleshing out" of federal regulations, which simply pro-
vided that voting could be done either in person or by proxy. Id. (citing 12
C.F.R. § 544.1(4)). The issue was therefore one of federal law. Id. The Second
Circuit recognized that state law generally governs access to shareholder voting
lists. Id. at 612 n.2. The court added, however, that "Congress could hardly
have intended that the rights of members of federal savings and loan associa-
tions to fair elections should vary with quirks of state law." Id. at 611.
The court concluded that the district court was "plainly right" in holding
that the management's actions were "unfair under federal law." Id. at 612.
83. See, e.g., Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (recognizing savings and loan claim against former directors
and officers for breach of fiduciary duties under federal common law).
84. Id. at 439.
85. 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw. 1983) (breach of fiduciary duty and negli-
gence claim brought against former directors and officers by stockholder of 90%
of shares).
86. Id. at 1132. The impact of the First Hawaiian court's decision is that
state-chartered banks can be sued in federal court under federal common law
causes of action.
87. Id. at 1130. The plaintiff was First Hawaiian Bank, the assignee of 90%
of the savings and loan's shares. Id. The original purchase of shares was fi-
nanced by the same bank. Id.
88. Id. The court's opinion does not provide any factual background for
the claims. See id.
89. Id. at 1132.
[Vol. 37: p. 14611474
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The First Hawaiian decision represents a breaking away from the de-
cision in Crowley. The First Hawaiian court permitted only the breach of
fiduciary duty claim to be governed by federal common law; state com-
mon law would govern an additional negligence claim.90 The court dis-
tinguished the claims on the ground that negligence is an area
traditionally left to state courts. 9 ' The court opined that there was no
interest in national uniformity which would be served by creating or ap-
plying any federal decisional law to the negligence claim, nor was any
statute applicable or relevant.
92
The second exception to Erie outlined in Texas Industries centers on
congressional intent to preempt state law. 9 3 In 1983, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board-now the Office of Thrift Supervision-promulgated
regulations under 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 "pursuant to the plenary and exclu-
sive authority of the Office to regulate all aspects of the operation of
Federal savings associations .... This exercise of the Office's authority
is preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the
operations of a Federal savings association. ' 9 4 Despite this regulation,
at least one court has continued to grapple with the question of whether
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and waste purport to ad-
dress the "operations of federal associations" within the meaning of 12
C.F.R. § 545.2.95 In Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kidwell,
96
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1131. The court found that federal common law remedies would
not be precluded where a federal statute's remedies did not afford the aggrieved
parties "at least a reasonable alternative to the relief sought." Id. at 1132 (citing
Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1982)). Because the Home Owner Loan
Act's remedial scheme did not provide the kind of remedy sought by the plain-
tiff, recognition of a federal common law cause of action would not be pre-
cluded. Id.
The court's reasoning here can be disputed on two grounds. First, since the
Home Owners Loan Act does not provide for a claim for negligence, the court's
refusal to recognize the negligence claim appears indistinguishable from its rea-
son for accepting the breach of fiduciary duty claim. After all, a breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim is arguably as much left to state corporate law as negligence is left
to state tort law. Second, the court recognized, but gave little more than lip
service to, a Supreme Court pronouncement that when a federal law carries an
integrated scheme of remedies but omits the relief sought by the plaintiff, the
court must assume that the requested relief was deliberately omitted. Id. at 1131
(citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)).
92. First Hawaiian, 558 F. Supp. at 1131; see also Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that claims of
negligence and waste of corporate assets are governed by state law while claim
for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by federal common law).
93. For a discussion of the exceptions to the Erie doctrine, see supra notes
70-76 and accompanying text.
94. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1991) (emphasis added) (cited with approval in Fed-
eral Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kidwell, 716 F. Supp. 1315, 1316 (N.D. Cal.
1989)).
95. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kidwell, 716 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
96. 716 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
19921 1475
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for example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California answered the question in the affirmative, stating that "where
negligence and waste are alleged regarding the lending practices of de-
fendants, these state causes of action constitute defacto regulation be-
cause they can directly affect the conduct of bank operations."
9 7
D. Recent Trend Toward Rejecting Recognition of Federal Common Law in
Savings and Loan Disputes
An identifiable trend has been developing toward rejecting recogni-
tion of a body of federal common law as applied to the savings and loan
industry, at least absent express preemption over the subject matter of
the claim. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Capozzi 9 8 represents
a watershed case for the holding that there is no body of federal com-
mon law governing directoral duties.9 9 In Capozzi, the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC) brought an action on behalf of itself
and as conservator for a Missouri thrift.10 0 The FSLIC alleged that the
thrift's former directors breached their fiduciary duties.' 0 ' At trial, the
district court rejected the FSLIC's argument that, in light of Crowley and
its progeny, the court should recognize a federal common law cause of
action for the FSLIC claims. 10 2 The Eight Circuit affirmed, reasoning:
The use of state law principles to determine director liability
... does not pose a threat to the integrity of the savings and
loan industry and the insurance fund. The crux of [plaintiff's]
claims is whether its directors breached agreements with or fi-
duciary duties to [the thrift]. In these circumstances an inter-
play certainly exists between federal regulations in the savings
and loan industry and the director defendants' liability. Ulti-
mately, however, no substantive rights or duties of the federal
government hinge on the outcome of this appeal.'
0 3
97. Id. at 1317; accord Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. Il. 1975) (noting intention of Congress to have
federal law govern regulation and supervision of federal savings and loan
associations).
98. 653 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd 855 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989).
99. Id. at 602 (rejecting argument that court should recognize "common
law" duties owed by savings and loan directors to institution in connection with
approval and consummation of certain "ill-advised" business transactions).
100. Id. at 594.
101. Id. The defendants had been directors of Bohemian Savings & Loan
up until the time the thrift failed. Id. The claims were based on the recovery of
certain assets lost on "allegedly ill-advised business transactions." Id. at 602.
The court provided no further details about the underlying transactions.
102. Id. at 602. Despite the federal regulations, the actions brought by the
FDIC were essentially breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims. Id.
103. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325-26
(8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989).
16
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By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held in Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Commissioner 104 that Congress did
not envision that all state regulations would be in conflict with the fed-
eral regulatory scheme governing thrift institutions.10 5 Ford Motor in-
volved the challenge of a Pennsylvania law forbidding simultaneous
ownership of a savings and loan and an insurance company. 10 6 Ford,
the simultaneous owner that brought the suit, sought declaratory relief
alleging, inter alia, that the Pennsylvania law was preempted by federal
legislation governing the savings and loan industry. 10 7 The Third Cir-
cuit agreed with Ford that federal law preempted Pennsylvania state law
to the extent that it applied to the acquisition of failing thrifts.' 0 8 The
court concluded, however, that Congress had not intended to entirely
preempt the states' authority to impose regulations upon savings and
loan associations operating within the state.109
Thus, under the Third Circuit's approach in Ford Motor, whether
federal regulations preempt state law depends on the claim brought.' 10
The Ford Motor court was "unconvinced that the federal banking regula-
tory scheme permits no conclusion other than that Congress intended to
occupy the field exclusively." I I ' The court noted that the regulations at
issue provided for explicit preemption on two of the issues in the case,
but not for a third."l
2
While none of the issues in Ford Motor involved breach of directors'
duties, the court's analysis is nonetheless instructive. Ford Motor estab-
lishes a claim-by-claim approach to determining whether federal regula-
tions in the banking industry preempt state law. Absent any conflict
between state law and federal objectives, the court will respect the state
law unless Congress has "left no room" for supplementary state
104. 874 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989).
105. Id. at 940.
106. Id. at 929-30. One of Ford's subsidiaries was an insurance company
that had been doing business in Pennsylvania for many years. Id. Another of
Ford's subsidiaries was a recently acquired savings and loan, also doing business
in Pennsylvania. Id. at 929.
107. Id. at 930. Ford also claimed that the state law violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. Id.
108. Id. at 936. One of the relevant statutory provisions providing for the
preemption of the Pennsylvania law states that the FSLIC "may authorize any
company to acquire control of said insured institution." Id. at 937 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1730a(m) (Supp. 1987).
109. Id. at 939 (accepting district court's view that intent of federal scheme
was to regulate operation of federally insured thrifts).
110. Id. at 936-37. The court specifically noted that "§ 64 I's proscription
of affiliations between insurance companies and savings and loan institutions has
not been preempted." Id. at 937.
111. Id. at 939 ("[W]e interpret the absence of clear preemptive language
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participation. 113
More recently, in AmenriFirst Bank v. Bomar,' 14 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida decided a case in which a
federally chartered savings and loan and its subsidiary brought suit.
1 15
The court held that federal common law did not recognize a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty by the savings and loan's officers, di-
rectors and outside accountants. 1 6 The court concluded that whether
traditional state law claims have a sufficient nexus to the federal govern-
ment to warrant the creation of a federal common law cause of action is
questionable.'17 The Bomar court further stated that federal common
law could not displace state corporate law because state law did not con-
flict or frustrate the objectives of federal legislation regulating federally-
chartered banks.' 18 The court nonetheless stated that the violation of
federal regulations would be some evidence of a breach of fiduciary du-
ties under substantive principles of state law.' 19
IV. THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR THE DIRECTORS OF STATE-
CHARTERED AND FEDERALLY CHARTERED BANKS
Against this background, the question remains: would the federal
courts recognize a body of federal common law regarding directors' du-
ties if a director of a federally chartered or state-chartered bank were
sued for breach of fiduciary duties? In order to answer this question, the
same factors courts have considered in the savings and loan cases should
be considered.
113. Id. at 938-39 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985)).
114. 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
115. Id. at 1369. The suit was a by-product of a settlement of class action
litigation brought by AmeriFirst's shareholders against the bank for violations of
federal securities laws. Id. Thomas Bomar, the defendant, was one of the bank's
former directors. Id. at 1369 n.2.
116. Id. at 1381-82. The effect of the holding was that the court had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the breach of fiduciary duty claims. Id. at 1381.
117. Id. at 1373 (citing Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d
1319 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989)). The Bomar
court was not ignorant of the decisions favoring the recognition of federal com-
mon law. Id. The court commented: "Although the substantial federal regula-
tion of savings and loans provides a tempting justification for creating federal
common law .to govern the fiduciary duty claims asserted by the plaintiffs, the
Court declines to follow those courts which have chosen to do so." Id.
118. Id. at 1374. The court reasoned:
[Permitting the bank to sue its former directors] for breach of fiduciary
duties under state common law principles will not interfere with the
successful functioning of the comprehensive federal scheme governing
the savings and loan industry or with the protection of the federal in-
surance fund even though the law of fiduciary duties may vary some-
what from state to state.
119. Id.
18
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A. The "Exemption from Texas Industries" Argument
In bringing suit against a savings and loan's directors and officers, a
plaintiff could argue that a breach of fiduciary duties has a bearing on
the FDIC's federal regulatory program within the meaning of Little
Lake.12 0 Following Crowley, a court would accept the plaintiff's argu-
ment and feel free to create federal common law to decide the claim.
12
1
Savings and loan cases like Crowley, however, may have asserted a mis-
placed reliance on Little Lake, which held that the rule of Erie did not
apply to controversies intertwined with a federal regulatory program.1
2 2
In Little Lake, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
"whether state law may retroactively abrogate the terms of written
agreements made by the United States through which the United States
acquired land for public purposes explicitly authorized by Congress." '
2 3
In the 1930s, the federal government aquired land in Louisiana by sale
and condemnation for the purpose of creating a wildlife refuge.' 2 4 The
land acquisition scheme was authorized by the Migratory Bird Conserva-
tion Act.' 2 5 The government granted mineral rights to the land to Little
Lake Misere for ten years. 12 6 After the ten year period ended, title re-
turned to the government, which in turn granted mineral right leases to
other parties. 1 27 A Louisiana law passed in 1940, however, provided
that when the federal government aquired land by sale or condemna-
tion, mineral rights would be reserved.
12 8
In deciding the issue, The United States Supreme Court stated that
"[t]o permit state abrogation of the explicit terms of a federal land ac-
quisition would deal a serious blow to the congressional scheme con-
templated by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and indeed all other
federal land acquisition programs."' 129 As a choice of law dispute, the
120. For a discussion on how Little Lake has been relied upon to find that a
breach of fiduciary duties of a savings and loan director has a bearing on a regu-
latory program, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the facts, holding and reasoning of Little Lake, see infra notes 122-35 and ac-
companying text.
121. For a discussion of Crowley, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text, and infra note 140.
122. United States v. Little Lake Misere Co., 412 U.S. 580, 604 (1973).




127. Id. at 582-83.
128. Id. at 584. Little Lake relied on the state law to dispose of the mineral
rights it had originally been granted in the two tracts of land. Id. (citing LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:5806, subdiv. A (West Supp. 1973)). Little Lake argued that the
state law rendered inoperative the provisions of the agreement between Little
Lake and the government as to the extinguishment of the reservations following
the ten-year period. Id.
129. Id. at 597. The Court further stated: "Certainty and finality are in-
despensible in any land transaction, but they are especially critical when, as here,
19
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Court stated that it must follow federal law and disregard the state law,
because the issue's outcome hinged on a federal regulatory program.' 30
Little Lake, in turn, referred to an earlier Supreme Court case,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.' 3 ' The issue in Clearfield Trust was
whether to apply Pennslvania law or federal law to resolve a dispute over
a check written by the United States and forged by the payee.' 32 After
the federal government learned that a check it wrote and sent never ar-
rived to the proper payee but was instead cashed by a forger, the federal
government sought to recover the amount of the cashed check from the
bank that guaranteed the endorsement. 133 The district court held that
Pennsylvania law applied, and because the federal govenment had un-
reasonably delayed in giving notice of the forgery, recovery was barred
under Pennsylvania common law.' 3 4 In reversing this determination,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the rule espoused in Erie did not apply
because the "rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper
which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law."' 135 The
Court added: "The duties imposed upon the United States and the
rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the
same federal sources."
13 6
An alleged breach of fiduciary duties against a bank director argua-
bly does not fall within the orbit of Little Lake. After all, "[c]orporations
are creatures of state law."' 3 7 Thus, directors' duties and federal regu-
lations do not "find their roots in the same federal source."' 3 8 As the
Court stated in Little Lake, asking the federal court to look to state law
when resolving a breach of fiduciary duty claim would not "deal a seri-
ous blow" to the federal regulatory scheme behind the Federal Deposit
the federal officials carrying out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit
scarce funds." Id.
130. Id. at 604. Resolution of the dispute ultimately boiled down to the
terms of the contract, and not federal common law. The Court stated:
The choice of law merges with constitutional demands of controlling
federal legislation; we turn away from state law by default. Once it is
clear that [the state law] has no application here, we need not choose
between "borrowing" some residual state rule of interpretation or for-
mulating an independent federal "common law" rule .... The contract
itself is unequivocal.
Id.
131. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
132. Id. at 364-65.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 366 (citing Market St. Title & Trust Co. v. Chelton Trust Co.,
145 A. 848 (Pa. 1929)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). For a further discussion of Cort v.
Ash, see infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
138. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366.
1480
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Insurance Act. 139 Moreover, one can argue that any nexus between the
FDIC as a regulatory agency on the one hand, and the traditional role of
state law to define directors' duties on the other, is remote and tenu-
ous. ' 4 0 In light of the Third Circuit's claim-by-claim approach in Ford
Motor, it is much less clear whether federal regulations attached to the
industry establish federal preemption over the entire banking industry,
precluding any state law from applying.141
FIRREA itself indicates how state law in this area is not entirely pre-
empted despite the enormous federal regulatory scheme woven into the
thrift and banking industries. Section 182 1(k) of the statute expressly
refers to state law as a source for defining "intentional tortious conduct"
and other "such terms." 14 2 While the statute holds directors and of-
ficers to a standard of "gross negligence," it fails to define the term,
leading some to believe that the standard should be defined under the
law of the state where the case arises. 14 3 Remarks made on the Senate
floor about the bill that ultimately became FIRREA shed even more light
on the matter. Generally, these statements reinforce the conclusion that
FIRREA only preempts state law with regard to the standard of liability
imposed on financial institution directors, leaving state law to guide the
remainder of the dispute. 144 Accordingly, a director charged with a
139. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597
(1973).
140. See Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325
(8th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[t]he use of state law principles to determine direc-
tor liability ... does not pose a threat to the integrity of the savings and loan
industry and the insurance fund"), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989).
141. But see City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 655
(E.D. Wisc. 1975). The Crowley court stated: "The fiduciary duties of officers
and directors to a federal savings and loan association are matters dealing with
the internal affairs of the association. Thus ... a state court adjudicating in this
area would have to apply federal common law rules rather than the laws of its
own state." Id.
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990). For the text of § 1821(k), see
supra note 24.
143. See Sczudlo & Dederick, supra note 5, at 127 (noting that reference to
"applicable state law" indicates that "gross negligence" may be defined under
laws of state in which case arises).
144. See 135 CONG. REC. S 4238 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989). In explaining a
proposed (and ultimately adopted) amendment to the bill, Senator Reigle
remarked:
State law would be overruled only to the extent that it forbids the FDIC
to bring suit based on "gross negligence" or an "intentional tort." In
determining whether or not conduct constitutes "gross negligence" or
an "intentional tort," applicable state law is to govern. This amend-
ment would allow the FDIC to sue a director or officer guilty of gross
negligence or willful misconduct, even if State law did not allow it. Un-
like other corporations, when a bank officer or director is guilty of gross
negligence or willful misconduct, it will often be the Federal taxpayer
who is harmed.
Id. S 4279 (statement of Senator Reigle).
Later the same day, Senator Roth commented:
.148119921
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breach of fiduciary duties under FIRREA may contend that the scope
and definition of the fiduciary duties should also be defined under state
law. 145
B. The "Express Congressional Authority" Argument
A review of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and regulations
promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the FDIC
do not reveal any blanket preemption clauses similar to the one issued
by the Office of Thrift Supervision in FIRREA. Neither the section of
the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) governing incorporation, or-
ganization and conversion of federal stock associations, nor the subsec-
tion governing boards of directors specifically, define a director's
duties. 146 Only two specific duties can be identified under the C.F.R.:
(1) "the specific duty of seeing that the Bank complies with applicable
provisions of the Act and these regulations,"'14 7 and (2) the duty to es-
tablish and maintain hazard insurance to protect the association's inter-
est in real estate security for its loans.' 4 8
The regulations are peppered with language suggesting a deliberate
attempt not to displace state law entirely. For instance, the section gov-
erning the disposition of credit life insurance income states that
"[d]irectors shall observe the rules in Sec. 2.4 and shall be mindful of
their duty under both the common law and 12 U.S.C. 73 [(oath of bank
directors)] to promote and advance the interests of the bank over their
own personal interests." 149 Furthermore, while removal for cause in-
cludes breach of fiduciary duty involving personal profit,150 breach of
fiduciary duty is not a defined term.
There is no intention, I am happy to say, to pre-empt State corporation
law in any general way. Section [1821 (k)] sets a standard of care owed
to the financial institution because it is federally insured. It is surgically
designed to protect the Federal interest, the taxpayers' interest, and no
other.
Id. S 4281 (statement of Sen. Roth). Senator Garn added:
I likewise am reluctant to pre-empt State corporation law. Here... we
have a special case. The pre-emption is limited to protecting a Federal
interest. To do so we impose on directors and officers of federally in-
sured financial institution[s] a standard of care they owe to the institu-
tion and its shareholders. We do this for the sole purpose of protecting
the insurance fund. We are not imposing any rules that go beyond our purpose.
Section [1821(k)] is not a general provision. It is limited.
Id. (statement of Sen. Garn) (emphasis added).
145. This argument is bolstered by the last sentence in section 1821(k),
which reads: "Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990).
146. See 12 C.F.R. § 552.6-1 (1992) ("The business and affairs of the associ-
ation shall be under the direction of the board of directors.").
147. Id. § 932.28.
148. Id. § 556.4.
149. Id. § 2.5 (emphasis added).
150. Id. § 563.39.
1482 [Vol. 37: p. 1461
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Congress has evinced intentions to preempt state law in some nota-
ble areas. Perhaps the most important area is the standard of liability
imposed upon financial institution directors and officers under FIRREA.
Section 212 of Title II of FIRREA holds directors and officers to a stan-
dard of gross negligence in actions where the FDIC is acting as conser-
vator or receiver, in actions purchased from or assigned by a receiver or
conservator or actions assigned by an institution in connection with re-
ceipt of FDIC assistance.' 5 1 The provision's legislative history indicates
that it does preempt state law with respect to the standard of liability
imposed upon a depository institution director.1
52
Besides liability for civil monetary damages, Congress has also indi-
cated an intention to preempt other areas of state banking law. One
area is indemnification. A national bank's articles of association cannot
allow the indemnification of directors and other bank officials against
expenses, penalties or other payments incurred in an action by a regula-
tory agency resulting in a final order assessing civil monetary
penalties. 153
The fact that specific duties are mentioned in the regulations and
that specific areas of state law are preempted by them does not necessar-
ily indicate that Congress has mandated a preemption over the entire
area of directors' duties. In the landmark implied cause of action deci-
151. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11 1990). For the text of § 1821(k), see
supra note 24.
152. For the relevant legislative history, see supra text accompanying note
28.
The preemption remark in the legislative history proves to be of great im-
portance. Without it, a defendant director could argue that the provision sets
forth a minimum-but not maximum-liability standard below which state legis-
latures may not address. An argument would exist that states are still free to
require conduct more culpable than gross negligence, such as recklessness,
before directors will be found guilty of misconduct. The argument stems from
the provision's declaration that "[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or af-
fect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(k) (Supp. I 1990). Under Pennsylvania law, a corporation may agree
through its stockholders to protect directors from personal liability for monetary
damages unless the director breached his duty of care and the director's conduct
constitutes self-dealing, willful misconduct or recklessness. 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1713 (Supp. 1991). Therefore, one could argue that holding a director
liable for misconduct under a standard less than what Pennsylvania defines
would impair a right of a Pennsylvania corporation. See FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F.
Supp. 533, 540 (D. Utah 1991) (noting that § 1821(k) "creates a national mini-
mum standard of gross negligence in civil suits for monetary damages against
officers and directors of federally insured depository institutions" (emphasis
added)).
The counterargument would be that § 1821(k) preempts state law because
it directly conflicts with state law provisions-like Pennsylvania's-limiting or
eliminating director liability absent conduct more culpable than gross negli-
gence. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)
(noting that state law is preempted by federal law if there is actual conflict be-
tween federal and state provisions).
153. 12 C.F.R. § 7.5217 (1992).
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sion of Cort v. Ash,' 5 4 for example, the Supreme Court stated that "ex-
cept where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation."'15 5 Thus, the absence of a clear preemption
of state law defining directors' duties suggests that Congress has not
expressly granted the federal courts authority to fashion a body of fed-
eral common law in this area.
C. The "Uniquely Federal Interests" Argument
The final consideration is whether the duties of a bank director in-
volve uniquely federal interests such that the creation of a body of fed-
eral common law is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests. The
First Hawaiian court, citing Rettig and Crowley, held that creation of fed-
eral common law is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.
156
Despite First Hawaiian, courts recently have focused on whether the fed-
eral interests are significantly threatened by the application of state
154. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort is most famous for establishing the criteria
necessary for recognizing an implied private cause of action under a federal stat-
ute. The case involved a stockholders' derivative action to enforce a federal
criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making contributions or expendi-
tures in connection with any presidential or vice presidential election. Id. at 68.
The Court held that a private cause of action could not be implied to enforce the
statute. Id. at 85. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous court, stated the
criteria for determining when a private right of action should be recognized:
1. Is the Plaintiff a member of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted?
2. Is there any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to
create a remedy or to deny one?
3. Is a remedy consistent with a legislative scene? and
4. Is this an area traditionally relegated to state law?
Id. at 80-85.
In the cases since Cort, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to infer a
statutory private cause of action absent the most compelling evidence of affirma-
tive congressional intent. See TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979) (noting private breach of fiduciary duty actions limited under
Investment Advisors Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979) (disregarding four Cort factors in favor of sole inquiry into congressional
intent); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Cori four-factor test was "an open invitation to federal
courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress."). The ultimate
focus today is on the legislative intent at the time the statute was passed.
Under FIRREA, there is no indication of congressional intent to provide an
implied cause of action. Recently, a federal district court found that FIRREA
provides no implied private cause of action. Homes by Michelle, Inc., v. Federal
Say. Bank, 733 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that "legislative
desire to regulate all financial institutions in similar manner does not evince cor-
responding intent to allow same private causes of action against all financial
institutions").
155. Cort, 422 U.S. at 84.
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law. 15 7 The issue has boiled down to whether compliance under both
state and federal law is impossible. 158
The shortcoming of those cases invoking federal common law is in
their failure to specifically name the federal interests implicated. The
Capozzi and Bomar courts, two courts that have rejected recognizing fed-
eral common law, noted that federal regulations are forward-looking,
not retrospective.' 59 The aim of federal regulations is to prevent insol-
vency in the first place, and not to provide recompense after insolvency
has occurred. 16 0 With their emphasis on forestalling insolvency, these
cases suggest that the true federal interest woven through the entire
fabric of the regulations is in preserving the fund that insures deposi-
tors' accounts. 16'
Indeed, FIRREA was passed with this interest specifically in
mind.' 62 FIRREA's text and legislative history show respect to state law
in the pursuit of protecting the insurance fund. 163 Thus, the issue sim-
ply cannot boil down to whether compliance under both state and fed-
eral law is feasible, for compliance under federal law, at least with
respect to FIRREA, will at times be a function of state law. 164 Congress'
express deferral to state law in FIRREA makes it impossible for the
courts in each circuit to apply the statute uniformly.16 5 Uniform appli-
cation of federal law thus cannot be asserted as a justification for relying
on federal common law rather than state law. Moreover, many state
157. See Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 937 (3d Cir.
1989); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th Cir.
1988), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989). For a discussion of Ford
Motor, see supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Capozzi, see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
158. Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 937.
159. Capozzi, 855 F.2d at 1326 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1979)); AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365,
1374 (S.D. Fla. 1326) (quoting Capozzi, 855 F.2d at 1326).
160. Capozzi, 855 F.2d at 1326.
161. See 12 C.F.R. § 330.3 (1991) ("In general, deposit insurance is for the
benefit of the owner or owners of funds on deposit.").
162. See 135 CONG. REC. S 4238, 4281 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Garn) (noting need to protect insurance fund); id. (statement of Sen.
Roth) (same).
163. For the relevant text of FIRREA, see supra note 24. For the relevant
legislative history, see supra note 28.
164. The Third Circuit has noted that, in savings and loan cases, a court
should respect state law unless Congress has "left no room" for supplementary
state participation. Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 938-39
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). Ford Motor is authority for the propo-
sition that Congress left room in FIRREA for state participation in defining the
"duty of care" and its scope. Id. at 940. For a more detailed discussion of Ford
Motor, see supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
165. Cf Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209
(1946) (noting that by permitting local taxation of real property, Congress made
it impossible to apply the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act with uniform
consequences in each state and locality).
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statutes were already on the books, so that Congress can fairly be
charged with full awareness of them when FIRREA was passed.' 6 6 It is
therefore reasonable to infer that the creation of federal common law is
unnecessary to protect the fund insuring depositors' accounts.
V. CONCLUSION
Financial institution directors must be wary of two sources of law
outside state law that can affect the liability they face in the discharge of
their duties. The first is FIRREA, which preempts state law regarding
the standard of liability imposed upon financial institution directors.
Any director guilty of breaching a "duty of care" under a uniform stan-
dard of gross negligence may be held personally liable for his wrongdo-
ing. 16 7  State law remains important in FIRREA, however, in
determining how gross negligence is defined. 168 It also remains impor-
tant in determining the scope of a director's duty and in the definition of
the duty itself.
Second, directors must be wary of federal common law, which often
provides much less protection to a director than state law. This Com-
ment argues that recognition of federal common law in actions against
financial institution directors is unwarranted. Congress has not given
the courts the power to develop substantive law in this area. On the
contrary, Congress' recent deferral to state law in FIRREA reflects an
understanding that directors will face varying degrees of liability de-
pending upon the law of the state in which the action arises. While
courts in the past have been more willing to rely on federal common
law, the trend is toward harmonizing state corporate law governing di-
rectors' duties with the federal government's interests in regulating the




166. Accord Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (observ-
ing that when Congress passes statute, it is presumed to act with full awareness
of existing legislation).
167. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. II 1990). For a discussion of§ 1821(k),
see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion on the role state law plays in defining gross negli-
gence under FIRREA, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the trend of courts toward not recognizing federal
common law to define the standard of liability, see supra notes 97-119 and ac-
companying text.
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